Perez v. Sharp is a landmark case in the history of civil rights in the United States, particularly in relation to marriage laws and racial discrimination. Decided by the California Supreme Court in 1948, the case addressed the constitutionality of California’s anti-miscegenation statutes, which prohibited interracial marriages.
The case is significant because it was the first state supreme court decision in the United States to permanently strike down an anti-miscegenation law. In its ruling, the court held that these laws violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The case not only challenged racial discrimination but also touched upon the fundamental right to marry and the right to religious freedom.
Facts of Perez v Sharp
The facts of Perez v. Sharp center around a couple, Andrea Perez and Sylvester Davis, who were both denied a marriage license in Los Angeles County due to the state’s anti-miscegenation laws. Perez, although Mexican-American, was classified as white due to her Spanish heritage, while Davis was identified as Negro. The couple had met while working in the defense industry during World War II.
They wished to marry in a Catholic ceremony, as they were both practicing Catholics. However, their application for a marriage license was denied by W.G. Sharp, the county clerk, because California Civil Code Sections 60 and 69 prohibited marriages between white persons and individuals of certain races, including Negroes, Mongolians, mulattoes, and members of the Malay race.
California’s anti-miscegenation statute had been in place since 1850, making it illegal for whites to marry blacks or mulattoes. Perez and Davis challenged the statute on several grounds, arguing that it violated their constitutional rights, including the right to marry and their right to practice their religion. They petitioned the California Supreme Court for an original writ of mandate, compelling the county clerk to issue the marriage license. The case raised significant constitutional questions about the intersection of race, marriage, and individual rights.
Issue
The primary issue in Perez v. Sharp was whether the California statutes prohibiting interracial marriages were constitutional. More specifically, the court had to determine whether the anti-miscegenation laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of equal protection and due process. The plaintiffs argued that these laws infringed on their fundamental right to marry and practice their religion. Furthermore, they contended that the state’s anti-miscegenation laws were based on racial prejudice and violated the principles of equality embedded in the U.S. Constitution.
Court’s Opinion and Reasoning in Perez v Sharp
The California Supreme Court ruled in favor of Perez and Davis by a 4-3 vote, holding that the state’s anti-miscegenation statutes were unconstitutional. Justice Roger J. Traynor authored the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Phil Gibson and Justice Jesse Carter. Justice Traynor argued that marriage is a fundamental right, and any law restricting the right to marry must meet strict scrutiny, particularly when the law is based on racial distinctions. He stated that laws which impose racial restrictions on marriage were “discriminatory” and violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court explained that racial distinctions in marriage laws were suspect and had been historically linked to prejudices that were antithetical to the principles of equality in American society. The court noted that marriage is not just a private contract between individuals but also a fundamental right that is deeply embedded in societal values. By restricting marriage on the basis of race, the state was violating the basic tenets of equality, liberty, and justice that are central to the American legal system. As such, the court held that the statutes prohibiting interracial marriage were unconstitutional because they impaired the fundamental right to marry on the basis of race alone.
The court also found that the language in the statutes was vague and uncertain, particularly with respect to the classification of individuals of mixed race. This lack of clarity made the law difficult to enforce and rendered it an unconstitutional infringement on the fundamental right to marry. The court emphasized that any law that restricts such a fundamental right must be clear and specific in its language, and the anti-miscegenation statutes failed this test.
In addition to the constitutional arguments related to equal protection and due process, Justice Douglas L. Edmonds, who wrote a separate concurring opinion, highlighted the infringement on religious freedom. Perez and Davis were Catholics, and one of their primary arguments was that the Catholic Church was willing to marry them, and thus the state’s anti-miscegenation law interfered with their right to fully participate in the sacraments of their religion, including marriage. Justice Edmonds concurred with the majority, asserting that the law violated not only the plaintiffs’ civil rights but also their religious liberty.
Justice Carter, in his own concurring opinion, echoed the sentiments of the majority but further criticized the law as a product of “ignorance, prejudice, and intolerance.” He emphasized that laws that discriminate on the basis of race had never been constitutionally valid, even when they were first enacted. He rejected any arguments suggesting that racial purity was a legitimate state interest, specifically rejecting references to Adolf Hitler’s writings as having any authority in legal reasoning.
Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion was written by Justice John W. Shenk, who was joined by Justices B. Rey Schauer and Homer R. Spence. Shenk argued that anti-miscegenation laws had a long history in American common law and were constitutionally valid when they were originally enacted. He contended that the laws had been enforced for nearly a century without challenge, and there was no basis for declaring them unconstitutional now. Shenk further argued that the historical context of these laws, which were enacted at a time when racial segregation was legally entrenched, made it difficult to consider them invalid under the U.S. Constitution. In his view, there had been no fundamental change in the factual situation that would warrant a different outcome.
Shenk’s dissent highlighted the entrenched social and legal realities of the time, particularly the widespread acceptance of racial segregation in various spheres of life, including marriage. He questioned the court’s authority to overturn a long-standing legal precedent and argued that such decisions should be left to the legislature, not the judiciary.
Conclusion
Perez v. Sharp remains a landmark case in the history of civil rights in the United States. The California Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the state’s anti-miscegenation laws was a powerful statement against racial discrimination and a reaffirmation of marriage as a fundamental right. The case not only challenged the legality of racially restrictive marriage laws but also highlighted the intersection of individual rights, civil rights, and religious freedom. The ruling set a significant precedent that would later influence the nationwide movement for racial equality and the eventual legalization of interracial marriage in the United States.