The case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court that clarified the standards for granting asylum and withholding deportation for aliens who fear persecution in their home countries.
The case arose from the interpretation of two provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): Section 243(h), which provides for withholding of deportation, and Section 208(a), which grants asylum.
The Court’s ruling in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca was pivotal in determining the standard of proof for asylum claims, setting the stage for future cases involving refugees and immigrants seeking protection in the United States.
Facts of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
The respondent in this case, Cardoza-Fonseca, a 38-year-old Nicaraguan citizen, entered the United States in 1979 as a visitor but overstayed her visa. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began deportation proceedings against her when it was discovered that she was in the country illegally.
In her defense, Cardoza-Fonseca applied for two forms of relief: withholding of deportation under Section 243(h) of the INA and asylum under Section 208(a).
Cardoza-Fonseca claimed that her brother had been tortured and imprisoned by the Sandinistas due to his political activities and that she, too, feared persecution upon returning to Nicaragua. Although Cardoza-Fonseca was not politically active herself, she argued that the Sandinistas would target her for interrogation regarding her brother’s whereabouts, as well as for her opposition to the regime.
The immigration judge hearing her case applied the “clear probability” standard for both claims, which is required under Section 243(h) for withholding of deportation. The judge found that Cardoza-Fonseca had not established a “clear probability of persecution” and therefore denied her requests for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge’s decision.
Cardoza-Fonseca then appealed the denial of her asylum claim to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the judge had applied the wrong standard. She contended that the “well-founded fear” standard, which is a lower threshold, should have been applied to her asylum claim under Section 208(a) instead of the higher “clear probability” standard that applied to her withholding of deportation claim under Section 243(h).
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Cardoza-Fonseca and ruled that the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation were different, with the asylum standard being more lenient.
The INS appealed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, bringing the case before the United States Supreme Court.
Legal Issues of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
The primary issue in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca was whether the “more likely than not” standard of proof, which is required under Section 243(h) for withholding of deportation, applied to asylum claims under Section 208(a).
In other words, the Court had to determine whether Congress intended for the two provisions to have the same standard for granting relief or whether the “well-founded fear” standard for asylum was a separate and less stringent requirement.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca Judgment
In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Cardoza-Fonseca and affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment. The Court held that the “more likely than not” standard under Section 243(h) did not apply to asylum claims under Section 208(a). Instead, the Court concluded that asylum applications under Section 208(a) required proof of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, a lower threshold than the “clear probability” standard required for withholding of deportation under Section 243(h).
Statutory Interpretation
The Court’s decision was grounded in a careful interpretation of the language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court examined the wording of Sections 208(a) and 243(h) and determined that Congress had intentionally used different standards in the two provisions.
Specifically, the Court noted that Section 208(a) uses the term “refugee,” which is broader in scope, while Section 243(h) refers to a more restrictive definition related to withholding deportation. The use of different terms indicated that Congress intended for the standards to be distinct.
The Court also pointed out that the legislative history of the INA supported the conclusion that Congress sought to align U.S. law with international refugee law. In particular, the Refugee Act of 1980 sought to bring U.S. law into conformity with the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, both of which recognized the “well-founded fear” standard for asylum.
The Court rejected the INS’s argument that the lower standard for asylum would result in granting greater benefits to asylum applicants than to those seeking withholding of deportation. The Court reasoned that asylum is a discretionary form of relief, meaning the Attorney General can grant or deny asylum at their discretion.
In contrast, withholding of deportation is mandatory if the applicant meets the higher “clear probability” standard.
Chevron Deference
The INS also relied on the principle of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), arguing that the Court should defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute. However, the Court disagreed with this argument.
It clarified that the question of whether Congress intended the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation to be the same was one of statutory construction for the courts to decide, not the agency. Since the statute’s language was clear, the Court saw no reason to defer to the agency’s interpretation.
Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the majority, commended the Ninth Circuit for its diligent work in recognizing the distinction between the two standards, and he criticized the INS for its failure to develop a consistent interpretation of the statute.
Dissenting Opinion
Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, in which they argued that the Court should have deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of the statutory language. Powell contended that the difference between the “well-founded fear” standard and the “clear probability” standard was minimal in practice, and that both standards involved qualitative determinations rather than strict mathematical thresholds. He also argued that the BIA, which had experience in adjudicating asylum applications, was in the best position to assess the standards.
Furthermore, Powell suggested that the BIA had already applied the lower standard in Cardoza-Fonseca’s case, but that her claim did not meet even that threshold. Cardoza-Fonseca had not been politically active herself and had not been personally targeted by the Nicaraguan government, which made her case less compelling under any standard.
Concurrence
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the judgment but emphasized that the Court’s decision was based on the clear language of the statute, which did not require extensive review of legislative history. He argued that the statute was unambiguous and that the Court should not have looked to legislative history or relied on Chevron deference. For Scalia, the decision simply followed the plain meaning of the statutory text.
Conclusion
The case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca remains a landmark decision in the area of U.S. immigration law. It clarified the distinction between asylum and withholding of deportation, setting a precedent for future asylum claims. The Court’s ruling in this case ensured that the more lenient “well-founded fear” standard applies to asylum, providing greater protection to individuals fleeing persecution.
While the dissenting opinion raised important points regarding agency deference, the majority’s decision established a clear and lasting interpretation of the law, which continues to guide U.S. asylum policy today.