Burnham v. Superior Court of California was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that addressed the constitutionality of a state court exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who was served with process while physically present in the state.
The case raised the question of whether such “transient jurisdiction” aligns with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court unanimously held that transient jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible; however, the Justices split on the reasoning behind this decision, producing multiple separate opinions.
Facts of Burnham v. Superior Court of California
In Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Dennis Burnham and Frances Cecilia Burnham, a married couple residing in New Jersey, agreed to divorce. Frances (“Francie”) moved to California in July 1987 with their two children. She filed for divorce in California prior to meeting the six-month residency requirement but after an agreement to delay divorce filings for a “no fault” ground. Dennis Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey citing desertion but had not served Francie at that point.
Dennis Burnham was personally served with the California divorce summons during a visit to California to handle unrelated business and to see his children. The service occurred at the children’s home on a Sunday. Shortly thereafter, Francie was served with the New Jersey summons. California courts later held the California divorce action was “first in time.”
Dennis Burnham contested the California court’s jurisdiction, filing a special appearance and moving to quash service of process. He argued that as a nonresident with no significant connection to California, the state courts lacked personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.
Procedural History
Initially, the Marin County Superior Court in California granted Dennis Burnham’s request to allow New Jersey courts to determine personal jurisdiction and assigned subject matter jurisdiction on in rem issues to California. However, upon reconsideration and citing the landmark decision Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), the California Superior Court reversed itself and denied the motion to quash service.
Dennis Burnham sought writ relief from the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, which denied the petition. The California Supreme Court also declined to grant relief. Subsequently, Dennis Burnham petitioned the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of transient jurisdiction in light of modern personal jurisdiction standards.
Approximately 29 months after the Supreme Court’s ruling, the California Superior Court granted the divorce in October 1992.
Legal Background of Burnham v. Superior Court of California
The question presented in Burnham v. Superior Court of California centered on whether longstanding common law practices permitting jurisdiction based on physical presence and service within the forum state remained constitutional under the Due Process Clause, especially after the Supreme Court’s decisions in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1946) and Shaffer v. Heitner (1977), which introduced the “minimum contacts” test.
Under the common law rule affirmed in Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), physical presence in the forum state at the time of service was sufficient to establish jurisdiction, regardless of residency or any connection between the lawsuit and the forum state. The modern developments in International Shoe and Shaffer required a showing that the defendant had “minimum contacts” with the state and that the exercise of jurisdiction conformed to “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” but these rules primarily addressed jurisdiction over defendants served outside the forum state.
The Supreme Court in Burnham v. Superior Court of California was called upon to clarify whether the physical presence rule remained valid post-International Shoe and Shaffer.
Issue
The central issue in Burnham v. Superior Court of California was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who was served with process while temporarily present in the state, even if the lawsuit is unrelated to any of the defendant’s activities within the state.
Burnham v. Superior Court of California Judgment
The Supreme Court unanimously held that transient jurisdiction based on service of process on a nonresident physically present in the state is constitutionally permissible under the Due Process Clause. However, the Justices were sharply divided on the reasoning, issuing multiple separate opinions.
Reasoning and Opinions
Justice Scalia’s Plurality Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and partially by Justice White, wrote the plurality opinion. He emphasized the historical pedigree of transient jurisdiction, tracing the principle to longstanding common law tradition that a state has jurisdiction over anyone physically served within its borders. He held that such “tag jurisdiction” satisfies due process precisely because of its deep-rooted and settled usage.
Justice Scalia rejected the application of the “minimum contacts” analysis to defendants who are physically served in the forum. He argued that neither International Shoe nor Shaffer undermined the traditional basis of transient jurisdiction. In his view, a test based on history and tradition provides a clear constitutional standard. Scalia criticized Justice Brennan’s concurrence for circular reasoning and vague standards of fairness.
Justice Brennan’s Concurrence
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor, agreed with the judgment but disagreed with Scalia’s historical test as exclusive. Brennan argued that all exercises of personal jurisdiction must be measured by contemporary due process standards, which include fairness and reasonableness.
He acknowledged the relevance of historical practice but emphasized modern realities, including ease of travel and communication, which make transient jurisdiction less burdensome. He argued that presence in the state means the defendant voluntarily avails himself of the state’s benefits, thus supporting jurisdiction. Brennan also pointed to procedural protections such as forum non conveniens to alleviate undue hardship.
Justice White’s Concurrence
Justice White concurred in part and in the judgment. He stressed that transient jurisdiction is so universally accepted that striking it down would be unwarranted. While he recognized the Court’s power to invalidate longstanding practices violating due process, he saw no reason to do so here. He further noted that intentional presence in the forum state generally precludes fairness challenges.
Justice Stevens’s Separate Concurrence
Justice Stevens wrote separately, concurring in the judgment but declining to join either Scalia or Brennan. He noted that the case was straightforward given the historical tradition, fairness considerations, and common sense. He cautioned against broad rulings arising from what he viewed as an “easy case.”
Conclusion
Burnham v. Superior Court of California reaffirmed the constitutional validity of transient jurisdiction based on personal service within the forum state. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that such service satisfies due process requirements, but the Justices diverged sharply on the doctrinal framework, balancing historical tradition against contemporary fairness standards.
The case stands as a significant reaffirmation of traditional jurisdictional principles while highlighting ongoing tensions in personal jurisdiction analysis between strict historical adherence and flexible due process considerations.