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Darby v Cisneros

Law

Citation:
Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 113 S. Ct. 2539, 125 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1993)

Court:
Supreme Court of the United States

Date:
June 21, 1993

Parties:

  • Petitioner: R. Gordon Darby
  • Respondent: Henry Cisneros, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)

The case of Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993), deals with the question of whether federal courts can require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, particularly when no statute or administrative rule specifically mandates exhaustion.

The case provides important insights into the application of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and establishes a precedent in determining when exhaustion of administrative remedies is required.

Facts of Darby v Cisneros

R. Gordon Darby, a real estate developer in South Carolina, was involved in transactions with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), where he had purchased properties using “straw purchasers” to circumvent HUD’s “rule of seven.”

This rule prevented individuals from receiving single-family mortgage insurance if they already had a financial interest in seven or more similar properties within the same subdivision or project. Darby’s actions led to HUD incurring over $6.6 million in insurance claims. HUD, upon suspecting Darby’s activities, moved to debar him from participating in HUD programs for 18 months.

The dispute arose when Darby, seeking to challenge the debarment, filed a lawsuit in federal district court in South Carolina, bypassing the internal review process provided by HUD. Darby claimed that the debarment was imposed as a punitive measure, which violated HUD’s own regulations and was thus “not in accordance with the law” under the APA. Darby requested an injunction to prevent the debarment from taking effect.

Despite HUD’s argument that Darby had failed to exhaust the internal administrative remedies, the District Court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the administrative process was inadequate, and seeking administrative remedies would be futile.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court’s decision. The issue brought before the Supreme Court was whether federal courts could require exhaustion of administrative remedies in the absence of an explicit statute or agency rule mandating it.

Issue

The key issue in Darby v. Cisneros was whether federal courts could require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), when neither the statute nor the agency rules explicitly required exhaustion of remedies.

Legal Background

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs judicial review of federal agency actions. The APA generally provides that individuals seeking judicial review of agency actions must first exhaust all available administrative remedies, unless the law or agency rules specifically exempt them from doing so.

In the case of Darby v. Cisneros, the question was whether this general principle of exhaustion applied when neither the relevant statute nor HUD’s administrative rules required exhaustion before judicial review. The APA itself does not uniformly require exhaustion but permits a court to require it if mandated by statute or agency rule.

Court’s Analysis in Darby v Cisneros

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Darby v. Cisneros centered on the interpretation of the APA and the broader principles of judicial review. The Court recognized that the APA creates a presumption in favor of judicial review of agency actions. According to the APA, judicial review is available to a party adversely affected by an agency decision unless the statute or regulations governing the agency action specifically preclude it.

The Court emphasized that exhaustion is not a universal requirement in administrative law. It is a doctrine designed to promote judicial efficiency and agency expertise. However, the Court found that such a requirement only applies when expressly required by statute or regulation.

In the case at hand, neither the HUD statute nor its regulations mandated exhaustion of administrative remedies. HUD had not included an explicit requirement for exhaustion in its rules governing the debarment process.

Therefore, the Court ruled that the general requirement to exhaust administrative remedies did not apply in Darby v. Cisneros, and Darby was not required to exhaust the internal HUD process before seeking judicial review.

The Court highlighted that, while the administrative remedies process may be useful, it was not a strict prerequisite for judicial review in this case. The decision marked an important clarification regarding the application of the exhaustion doctrine under the APA. In this case, the Court concluded that where a statute or regulation does not require exhaustion, judicial review could proceed without it.

Darby v Cisneros Judgment

The Supreme Court held that federal courts cannot require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review under the APA, where neither the statute nor the agency rules explicitly mandate such exhaustion. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Court also emphasized that the APA does not impose a blanket exhaustion requirement. Rather, judicial review is permissible unless the statute or agency rule specifically requires exhaustion. Therefore, Darby was not obliged to pursue the administrative remedy before taking his case to court.

Conclusion

The case of Darby v. Cisneros clarified the scope of the exhaustion doctrine under the APA. The Supreme Court ruled that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required before judicial review unless explicitly mandated by statute or agency regulations. This decision has had a lasting impact on the interpretation of administrative law, reinforcing the importance of judicial access and the presumption in favor of review when no clear exhaustion requirement exists.